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Introduction
 Rootkit evaluation:
– Originally placed in user space with root 
privileges  to hide it
– Rootkits moved from user space to kernel 
space and beyond!
– Goal: somehow isolate rootkit from host 
platform using platform's stealth capabilities
 Stealth – Isolation
 Can we use stealth/isolation capabilities of x86 
platforms to improve security properties?
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Motivation
 Why to improve computer platform security properties?
 Example: Time-Of-Check-Time-Of-Use (TOCTOU) problem
– Cf. Trusted Computing Group (TCG) attestation model
• Chain of Trust starting at Root of Trust for 
Measurement (RTM)
– Derives and stores fingerprint of software 
before software gets execution control
– TOC: once, just before execution
– No statement about runtime behavior
(cf., e.g., buffer overflow attacks)
(STMicroelectronics)
RTM BIOS
TPM
Boot loader Kernel Application ...
Store fingerprint (hash value)
Derive fingerprint (hash value) / hand execution control over
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Goals
 Understand isolated execution environments to:
i. Develop countermeasures against powerful
and stealthy rootkits
ii.Use them to enhance platform's security 
properties
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Challenges
 Research mainly done on rootkits
 Monitor needs safe place to stand: “Learning from 
Rootkits”
– Understand properties of rootkit environments
– Related to Trusted Computing Base
 Monitor environment must be bullet proof
– Rootkit environments are not!
 Measurement strategy
– How, when and what to measure?
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Processor
Core
Analysis of x86 Platform
Ring 0 (kernel mode)
Drivers
Services
Ring 3 (user mode)
 Protected Mode
Rings for Domain
Isolation
User mode rootkits
Kernel mode rootkits
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Processor
Core
Analysis of x86 Platform
Ring 0 (kernel mode)
Ring 3 (user mode)
“Ring -1” (hypervisor)
Virtual machine based rootkits
 HW Virtualization
Extensions:
E.g. OS Isolation
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Analysis of x86 Platform
 System Management Mode (SMM):
Special Processor Mode
Processor
Core
Ring 0 (kernel mode)
Ring 3 (user mode)
“Ring -1” (hypervisor)
“Ring -2” (SMM)
SMM based rootkits
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Analysis of x86 Platform
 Intel Active Management 
Technology (iAMT):
Processor
Core
Ring 0 (kernel mode)
Ring 3 (user mode)
“Ring -1” (hypervisor)
“Ring -2” (SMM)
“Ring -3” (AMT)
AMT based rootkits
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Challenges for Attackers/Rootkits
Monitor is trustworthy
Could be used to attack monitor
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Conclusion and Further Research
 Modern x86 platforms have very powerful stealth capabilities
(stealthier than root in user mode)
– Cf. kernel mode, VMBR, SMM, iAMT
➢ Basis for monitor environment
 Further Research:
– Countermeasures against rootkits (e.g., ring -3 rootkits)
– Measurement strategy (cf. TOCTOU example)
• When and what to measure?
– Depends on use cases!
• Which “ring”?
– Develop runtime monitoring/attestation system 
according to measurement strategy
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Thank you!
Questions?
